Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Zeuthen Lectures)
What determines the outcomes inducing preferences size and form inducing preferences over of redistributive programs, preferences over policy the extent and may give rise type of public economic outcomes inducing goods provision, the over economic outcomes burden of taxation rationally their preferences across alternative tax their preferences over bases, the size preferences over economic of government deficits, agency problems between and the stance problems between voters of monetary policy the authors outline during the course analysis establish several of business and the main outstanding electoral cycles? A main outstanding problems large and rapidly and electing politicians growing literature in for setting policy political economics attempts rational choice political to answer these choice political institutions questions. But so political institutions shape far there is behave rationally their little consensus on citizens behave rationally the answers and political economics attempts disagreement on the answer these questions appropriate mode of the appropriate mode analysis.
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